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THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
MISCONCEIVED: END TO COMMON LAW
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION?
KENNETH F. HOFFMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1907 the United States Supreme Court created the "primary
jurisdiction doctrine," which bars court relief whenever a court de-
termines that the plaintiff's cause would more appropriately be heard
by an administrative tribunal, either to ensure "uniformity" or to make
use of particular administrative "expertise."', In 1917 Franz Kafka
wrote the major portion of his famous unfinished novel, The Trial,2
in which he introduced the reader to Joseph K., a man arrested for an
unspecified crime, who was shuttled from bureaucrat to bureaucrat,
each lacking "authority" or "jurisdiction" to determine the infraction
for which Joseph K. was to be tried. In 1973 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico embraced Kafka's bureaucratic nightmare when it dis-
torted the primary jurisdiction doctrine to bar an action brought by
that state's attorney general and an environmental group to abate a
pollution-caused public nuisance?
The principal purpose of this article is to examine the effect of ap-
plying the primary jurisdiction doctrine to common law actions that
seek abatement of pollution-caused nuisances. The article reviews both
the history of the doctrine and its inherent limitations. Traditionally
government has possessed the authority and the duty to seek abatement
of nuisances that threaten the public health and welfare; concurrently
the courts of equity have had jurisdiction to hear such actions. This
article describes how the primary jurisdiction doctrine destroys both
that traditional authority and that jurisdiction, replacing them with
administrative control by agencies that, most commentators agree, are
unresponsive to public needs.
The plight of Kafka's Joseph K., who searched in vain for justice,
is not unlike that of modern plaintiffs who seek to abate a pollution-
caused nuisance. These litigants, hoping to present their case to the
court of equity, may instead find the way barred by the doctrine of
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Florida. B.S., Ohio University, 1961; J.D., Cleve-
land State University, 1968. The author served as Trial Attorney with the Land and
Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, from 1969 through 1971.
1. Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
2. F. KAFRA, THm TRIAL (Mod. Libr. ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as KAFKA].
3. State ex rel. Norvell v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 510 P.2d 98 (N.M. 1973).
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primary jurisdiction. Joseph K. learned too late the futility of his search
for justice:
"How am I being deluded?" asked K. "You are deluding yourself
about the Court," said the priest. "In the writings which preface the
Law that particular delusion is described thus: before the Law stands
a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the coun-
try who begs for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that
he cannot admit the man at the moment. The man, on reflection, asks
if he will be allowed, then, to enter later. 'It is possible,' answers the
doorkeeper, 'but not at this moment.' 4
The Priest continued:
"These are difficulties which the man from the country has not ex-
pected to meet, the Law, he thinks, should be accessible to every man
and at all times, but when he looks more closely at the doorkeeper in
his furred robe, with his huge pointed nose and long thin Tartar
beard, he decides that he had better wait until he gets permission to
enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him sit down at the
side of the door. There he sits waiting for days and years."
5
The man from the country awaited this permission for years; finally
his health failed and, as the Priest explained it:
"The doorkeeper perceives that the man is nearing his end and his
hearing is failing, so he bellows in his ear: 'No one but you could
gain admittance through this door, since this door was intended for
you. I am now going to shut it.' "
Joseph K. finally realized that "[t]he doorkeeper gave the message of
salvation to the man only when it could no longer 
help him.'"
Has the action of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, adopting the
"doctrine of primary jurisdiction" to deny the state's chief legal officer
access to state courts for pressing suits of public concern," brought us
one step closer to the world of Joseph K.?
The plaintiffs in the New Mexico case claimed that the defendant's
Four Corners Power Plant, located in northwestern New Mexico, was
emitting such amounts of particulate matter, sulphur oxides, nitrogen
4. KAFKA 267.
5. Id. at 268.
6. Id. at 269.
7. Id. at 269-70.
8. State ex rel. Norvell v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 510 P.2d 98 (N.M. 1973).
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oxides and mercury that it had created a public nuisance. The trial
court denied a motion to dismiss the case. The New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed that decision, remanding the case to the lower court for
dismissal. The court's rationale was that primary jurisdiction for air
and water pollution control rested with the New Mexico Environ-
mental Improvement Agency and that claims for relief, including in-
junctive relief, against polluters must be evaluated by that agency, not
the courts. This case is analyzed in greater depth later in this article.9
At this point it will be helpful to review the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine: its creation, development and, particularly, how it came to be
applied in a public nuisance action.
II. THE DoCTRINE'S CREATION
It is generally agreedo that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was
established in the case of Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cot-
ton Oil Co."" In Texas & Pacific a shipper, claiming that a carrier rate
properly published under federal regulations was "unreasonable,"
sought to recover the excess amount paid. The Court considered the
fundamental question to be
the scope and effect of the act to regulate commerce upon the right
of a shipper to maintain an action at law against a common carrier
to recover damages because of the exaction of an alleged unreason-
able rate, although the rate collected and complained of was the rate
stated in the schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and published according to the requirements of the act to regu-
late commerce, and which it was the duty of the carrier under the
law to enforce as against shippers.12
The Court concluded that to allow courts and juries to determine
whether an established rate was unreasonable would destroy the ef-
ficacy of the Interstate Commerce Act because courts would not always
reach the same conclusion. The Court feared that the resulting fluctua-
tion and variance in standards would make uniform rates impossible.-
Although it acknowledged that section 22 of the Interstate Commerce
Act provided that nothing in the Act "shall in any way abridge or alter
9. See pp. 496-97 infra.
10. See F. CooPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 317 (1951); 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE f 19.01, at 4 (1958); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HAv.
L. REv. 1037, 1042 (1964); Note, Primary Jurisdiction in Environmental Cases: Suggested
Guidelines for Limiting Deferral, 48 IND. L.J. 676 (1973).
11. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
12. Id. at 436.
13. Id. at 440.
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the remedies now existing at common law or by statute," the Court
nevertheless concluded that the clause could not be reasonably in-
terpreted to mean that shippers retained a common law right, "the
continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the
provisions of the act."'1 4 Such an interpretation, the Court reasoned,
would have rendered the Act self-destructive. 5
Professor Davis 6 suggests that the best judicial formulation of the
doctrine appears in Far East Conference v. United States:'7 "[I]n cases
raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges
or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies
created by congress for regulating the subject matter should not be
passed over." Unfortunately, the role that "administrative expertise"
plays in the application of the doctrine is uncertain. 8 Nonetheless,
since 1907 courts have continued to invoke the doctrine, primarily in
railroad shipping-rate cases involving the authority of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The doctrine has also been applied to cases
affecting the authority of such agencies as the Civil Aeronautics Board,' 9
the National Labor Relations Board,20 the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion 21 and the National Railroad Adjustment Board 22 and has been
relied upon in antitrust cases.23
The United States Supreme Court, in Great Northern Railway Co.
v. Merchants Elevator Co.,24 limited application of the doctrine of
14. Id. at 446.
15. Id.
16. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 10, 1 19.01, at 4.
17. 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
18. See 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 10, f 19.01, at 5. There the author states:
The principle reason behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not, and
never has been the idea that 'administrative expertise' requires a transfer of power
from courts to agencies, although the idea of administrative expertise does to some
extent contribute to the doctrine.
Many courts, however, apply the doctrine when they decide that an administrative
agency has the special expertise or competence needed to settle the litigated issue. See, e.g.,
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963). The Supreme Court ex-
pressly disavowed any transfer of court jurisdiction to administrative tribunals when it
stated that removal of a case to an administrative agency merely "postpones" the court's
jurisdiction. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963). See note
30 infra for a discussion of another federal court "postponement" doctrine, that of "ab-
stention."
19. See, e.g., Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
20. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner
v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
21. See, e.g., United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
22. See, e.g., Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385
U.S. 157 (1966).
23. 'See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
24. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
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primary jurisdiction to questions of fact and refused to apply it to
questions of law.2 5 This decision should have prevented the application
of the doctrine to a common law action to abate a pollution-caused
nuisance because the determination of what constitutes a public nui-
sance is a matter of law.2 6 Courts unfortunately have had great difficulty
in applying the decision; they have found the distinction between fact
and law difficult to perceive.27
It might be expected that authorities in a specific area of law would
support a doctrine that perpetuates or enlarges the scope of that body
of law. Indeed, Professor Davis highly approves of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction and has concluded that "[t]he cases on primary
jurisdiction, both state and federal, form a coherent body of law, un-
usually free from confusion or inconsistency.'2 8 Few authors agree with
Davis' assessment of the primary jurisdiction doctrine as a body of law
free from confusion or inconsistency2 Many legal scholars now ques-
25. Id. at 290-91.
26. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
27. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv.
577, 587 (1954).
28. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 10, g 19.01, at 6 (emphasis added).
29. Jaffe fears that the doctrine "is in danger of becoming a stereotype, an automatic
judicial response to an abstraction labelled 'expertise.' " Jaffe, supra note 27, at 603.
Bernard Schwartz concludes that federal courts applying the doctrine have already gone
"too far":
To require preliminary resort to a forum which cannot give the plaintiff the relief
which he requests is to revert to artificial dichotomization of remedial justice, such
as that which prevailed when law and equity were distinct and competing systems.
Why should the plaintiff have to bring two actions on the one cause of action when
the whole trend of our law, since the merger of law and equity, has been away from
such factitious divisions of justice?
Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo.
L.J. 495, 504 (1953). See also Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 436, 446 (1954),
in which Louis Schwartz terms the doctrine "drastic judicial legislation," and "the most
far reaching doctrine of judicial self-sterilization."
Other writers have challenged the application of the doctrine to specific areas of law.
See, e.g., Ginsburg, Antitrust and Stock Exchange Minimum Commissions: A Jurisdictional
Analysis, 24 U. MiAmi L. REV. 732, 735-36 (1970) (doctrine inapplicable to antitrust);
Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction To Decide Antitrust jurisdiction: A Practical Approach
to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 812, 813 (1967); Lewers, Primary Jurisdiction
and the Royalty Owner: A Misapplied Doctrine, 23 Sw. L.J. 454, 487 (1969); Comment,
Primary Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 192, 198 (1957). But see Fremlin,
Primary Jurisdiction and the Federal Maritime Commission, 18 HASTINcS L.J. 733, 793
(1967), in which the author concludes that application of the doctrine is "well worth the
delay."
Ralph Nader apparently disagrees with the view expressed by Ginsburg, supra. See
Green & Nader, Economic Regulations v. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man,
82 YALE L.J. 871, 881 (1973), in which the authors point out that the primary jurisdiction
doctrine means that "regulatory agencies, and not the Antitrust Division or the courts,
make the decisive policy decision on proposed mergers,"
1974]
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tion the continued usefulness of the doctrine, even within the limited
area of federal rate cases in which it first appeared. 0
How, then, did the Supreme Court of New Mexico come to rely in
Norvells' upon the doctrine to bar civil action for an injunction to
abate a public nuisance? The opinion does not supply much insight.
The court observed that in most cases it had studied, administrative
procedures created to regulate environmental control did not abrogate
longstanding court remedies.8 2 The court even concluded that "[f]act
situations may arise in which the nuisance statutes ought to remain
available," and added that the wisdom and efficacy of its disposition of
the issue on appeal would be tested by time and conceivably found
State courts usually have been less eager than federal courts to invoke the primary
jurisdiction doctrine. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Transradio
Press Serv. Inc., 53 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 1951) (where either court or administrative
agency could have heard case, court would dispose of it "rather than impose the burden
on litigants of litigating the case in another forum"); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Weiss, 113
So. 2d 884, 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (airline rate discrimination case in which
court, refusing to apply the doctrine, stated that its application is appropriate only when
uniformity or particular expertise is required, or when there are factual intricacies "gen-
erally regarded as being beyond the capacity of a court to grasp and determine"); Central
R.R. v. Culpepper, 76 S.E.2d 482, 485 (Ga. 1953) (under the Federal Railway Labor Act
the doctrine does not apply where facts present a wrong which would result in irreparable
injury); Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co., 193 A. 879 (R.I. 1937)
(rejecting the doctrine in an action for damages brought by a customer against the state
public service commission since state agency had no authority to award damages, and
therefore court ultimately would have to hear the case); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp.,
344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. 1961) (refusing to apply the doctrine where the issue (trespass)
was inherently judicial in nature and where the legislature had not vested exclusive
jurisdiction in an administrative agency); Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State, 456
S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (if the issue is one inherently judicial in nature,
courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless legislature has granted exclusive jurisdiction
to an administrative body).
30. The primary jurisdiction doctrine shares many of the characteristics of the doc-
trine of "abstention," another doctrine instituted by federal courts to avoid hearing cer-
tain disputes. The abstention rule requires that a federal forum avoid hearing a cause
more appropriately decided in the state forum. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970);
City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Like the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the abstention rule places upon plaintiffs the
burden of litigating in two forums. The doctrine almost inevitably compels the com-
plainant to maintain one part of his claim in state court and to reserve the remainder
of his grievance for subsequent resolution by the federal courts. See, e.g., England v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). This situation arises only because the
courts consider application of the doctrine not an "abdication" of federal jurisdiction, but
rather a "postponement" of the exercise of that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hill v. El Paso, 437
F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1971). Clearly the Supreme Court's admonition that the better practice
is to retain jurisdiction rather than to dismiss the action has not affected the courts'
fondness for the abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
31. State ex rel. Norvell v. Arizona Pub, Serv. Co., 510 P.2d 98 (N.M. 1973).
32. Id. at 102.
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wantingA3 The court did not decide whether the pollution control
statutes of New Mexico repealed by implication the public nuisance
statutes; instead, it held that the problem was not one of remedy but
rather one of coordination between the judicial and administrative
arms of government. From its analysis of cases, the court found that it
possessed the discretion to accept or reject the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine. 84 Still, it chose to create a firm, non-discretionary bar to public
nuisance actions to abate pollution.
In reaching its decision the court was influenced by the fact that the
administrative scheme established by the state, as evidenced by its en-
vironmental laws, regulated the same field as that in which the plain-
tiffs wanted the trial court to act. The state supreme court believed
that the trial court could not solve the problem either more quickly or
better than could the administrative agencies, and expressed its concern
that the trial court's intervention would "even hamper" the agencies'
finding a solution to the problem.85
The court was influenced by the language of the Federal Clean Air
Act defining "secondary ambient air quality standards."3' B The de-
fendants were not complying with these standards and had merely
"committed themselves" to the installation of additional air quality
devices.3 7 Yet the court found it more important that the defendants
were spending $21,500,000 to control emissions.38 The court refused to
face the only real issue-whether human beings were being threatened
with irreparable physical injury and required the injunction sought to
protect their health. This central issue was nowhere mentioned in the
court's lengthy opinion. The opinion did include, however, an elabo-
rate discussion of the need for giving the administrative agency ex-
clusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes under its rules and
regulations. 9 Leaving the plaintiffs no meaningful redress in the ad-
ministrative process, the court reversed the trial court's order denying
dismissal.4 0 By this act the court of equity lost its traditional jurisdic-
tion over public nuisance actions.
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 105.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c)(4) (1970).
37. 510 P.2d at 102.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 101.
40. The court found that even though there was no procedure by which plaintiffs
could apply to the agency for relief, plaintiffs could refer their claims to the agency. In
an analogous, yet distinct, area of law, it has been held that the courts do not require
exhaustion of administrative remedies when to attempt such exhaustion obviously would
be futile, or where irreparable damage is likely to occur in the meantime. See, e.g., People
1974]
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III. THE TRAnITIONAL DUTY AND AUTHORITY
OF GOVERNMENT AND THE COURTS To ABATE NUISANCES
The elimination of a state government's authority to seek court re-
lief to abate a public nuisance, coupled with simultaneous restriction of
the equity courts' powers, is of legal and social importance. The power
and responsibility of every government to petition its own courts to
prevent injury to the public welfare was well recognized by the end of
the nineteenth century. 41 This right of the state as parens patriae to
receive the assistance of the courts through injunctive relief to prevent
such injury has been unchallenged. 42 The proper state officer to seek
abatement of public nuisances is the state's attorney general, 43 whose
authority to act arose in most states under the common law.4 4 Suits by a
state in its sovereign capacity and instituted by its chief legal officer can
be maintained without showing a special injury to the state.
4 5
The common law concerning nuisances and their abatement has
existed for centuries, and courts have recognized that air pollution con-
v. City of Los Angeles, 325 P.2d 639, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). Of course, in public nui-
sance actions irreparable injury is always alleged.
41. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895).
42. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 (1972); Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 237 (1907); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D. Me. 1973); United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972); Reed v. County Comm'rs,
21 F.2d 144, 147 (E.D. Pa.), af'd per curiam, 21 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1927), aff'd, 277 U.S.
376 (1928).
43. See, e.g., Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 98 (1838);
People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 375 (Cal. 1897); State ex tel. Landis v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 155 So. 823, 827 (Fla. 1934); State ex tel. Delmar Jockey Club v. Zachritz, 65
S.W. 999, 1000 (Mo. 1901), appeal dismissed, 184 U.S. 697 (1902).
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 155 So. 823, 827 (Fla. 1934);
State ex rel. Davis v. Love, 126 So. 374, 376 (Fla. 1930); Johnson v. Commonwealth ex
tel. Meredith, 165 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Ky. 1942); People ex tel. Castle v. Daniels, 132 N.E.2d
507, 509 (I11. 1956); State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 112 N.W. 269, 272 (Minn. 1907);
Kennington-Saenger Theatres v. State ex rel. Dist. Att'y, 18 So. 2d 483, 486 (Miss. 1944).
New Mexico's supreme court, however, has held that the New Mexico Attorney General
has no inherent common law powers, but only the powers expressly conferred upon him
by statute or the state's constitution. See State ex tel. Att'y Gen. v. Reese, 430 P.2d 399,
406 (N.M. 1967).
45. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945); Georgia v. Tennes.
see Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1956);
State ex rel. Delmar Jockey Club v. Zachritz, 65 S.W. 999, 1000 (Mo. 1901), appeal dismissed,
184 U.S. 697 (1902); State v. Pacific Express Co., 115 N.W. 619, 623 (Neb. 1908); State ex
tel. McCain v. Metschan, 46 P. 791, 793 (Ore. 1896). The rights to be protected are often
termed "quasi-sovereign" interests. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
258 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., supra; Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp.
1097, 1100 (D. Me. 1973).
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stitutes a nuisance at least since Aldred's Case4" in 1610. By the middle
of the nineteenth century the United States Supreme Court had con-
cluded that "[t]he suppression of nuisances injurious to public health
or morality is among the most important duties of government." 47 In
the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,4 8 the Court
defined a nuisance as "the right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard."
The common law offers no support for a doctrine that bars a state,
acting through its chief legal officer and its courts, from exercising its
historical authority to protect its citizens' welfare. It is doubtful that
this application was contemplated by the Supreme Court when it
created the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in 1907.
IV. THE COUNTERCURRENT
The Attitude of the United States Supreme Court. The decision of
the New Mexico Supreme Court represents a countercurrent against
the continuing trend to expand legal remedies for environmental pro-
tection. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee"9 the United States Supreme
Court broadened federal law to include a remedy against public nui-
sances to supplement remedies already provided by federal pollution
control statutes. In its unanimous opinion the Court expended con-
46. 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610).
47. Phalen v. Virginia, 49 US. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1847).
A public nuisance is one which affects an indefinite number of persons, or all the
residents of a particular locality, or all people coming within the extent of its
range of operation, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal.
B.AcKt's LAw Dic'rIONARY 1215 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Public nuisances, particularly those
pollution-caused, can become private nuisances simultaneously when an individual's right
to the reasonable use of his property is impaired. Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 129
N.W.2d 217, 220 (Wis. 1964). The Supreme Court recognized the raison d'etre for nuisance
law long ago:
There is no doubt of the general proposition that a man may do what he will with
his own, but this right is subordinate to another, which finds expression in the
familiar maxim: Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. His right to erect what he
pleases upon his own land will not justify him in maintaining a nuisance, or in
carrying on a business or trade that is offensive to his neighbors. Ever since Aldred's
case, 9 Coke, 57, it has been the settled law, both of this country and of England,
that a man has no right to maintain a structure upon his own land, which, by
reason of disgusting smells, loud or unusual noises, thick smoke, noxious vapors,
the jarring of machinery or the unwarrantable collection of flies, renders the oc-
cupancy of adjoining property dangerous, intolerable or even uncomfortable to its
tenants. No person maintaining such a nuisance can shelter himself behind the
sanctity of private property.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1897).
48. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
49. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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siderable effort discussing the web of federal laws enacted to prevent
water pollution, including regulations promulgated by the Corps of
Engineers to control, through issuance of permits, discharges and de-
posits into navigable waters.50 The Court found a federal common law
of public nuisance to exist; 51 the opinion stated that the federal en-
vironmental protection statutes did not necessarily mark the outer
bounds of the federal common law, but instead provided useful guide-
lines to fashion such rules of decision. Most important, however, was
the Court's statement that "[t]he application of federal common law
to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not in-
consistent with the Water Pollution Control Act." 52 The Court con-
cluded that future federal laws might preempt the federal common
law of nuisance 53 but, until such time, federal courts possess the power
to assess the equities in public nuisance actions based on water pollu-
tion.51
The Position of Congress. The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, substantially amended in 1972,55 clearly states that it shall not be
construed to supersede or to limit the functions of any federal agency
controlling water pollution. The Act also reserves primary jurisdiction
for pollution control to the states,56 and preserves all common law and
statutory rights of any person to seek pollution abatement.5 7
At least one acknowledged purpose of the Act is to encourage state
and interstate action to abate pollution;, 8 to accomplish this the Act
authorizes citizens' suits to enforce its provisions.5 9 The Clean Air Act "
includes analogous provisions.6 ' The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 encourages state and citizen participation in the evaluation
of federal actions which might significantly affect the environment.
62
50. Id. at 101-02.
51. Id. at 103. The decision, in effect, overruled an 1888 holding that there was no
federal common law of nuisance with respect to navigable waters. See Willamette Iron
Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888).
52. 406 U.S. at 103 n.5. Congress provided in § 10(b) of the Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1160(b) (1970), that, except as a court might otherwise decree in an enforce-
ment action, "[s]tate and interstate action to abate pollution of interstate or navigable
waters shall be encouraged and shall not ... be displaced by Federal enforcement action."
53. 406 U.S. at 107.
54. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-376 (Supp. 1974)).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. II 1972).
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1370 (Supp. II, 1972).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970).
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(a)(3), 1857h-2, 1857i(a) (1970).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), especially 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
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The View of Legal Scholars. Legal scholars recently have encouraged
reliance upon common law remedies, especially those arising under the
theories of trespass and nuisance, to abate pollution.3 These writers
and scholars agree with the United States Supreme Court and Congress
that legal methods to seek abatement of environmental pollution
should be cumulative, not exclusive. 64
V. ZONING, PERMITS AND "DUE CARE"
Closely related to the law delineating the historic rights and duties
of the courts and the chief state legal officers is the case law holding that
nuisances cannot be authorized by zoning, permits or licenses, or by the
offender's use of "due care" or the best available technology. The
United States Supreme Court itself has noted, "It is a principle of the
common law, that the king cannot sanction a nuisance." 65
Zoning. Zoning generally has not prevented a court determination
that an abatable nuisance exists in fact. 66 It has been held that a court
63. Concerning air pollution, see Juergensmeyer, Common Law Remedies and Pro-
tection of the Environment, U.B.C.L. REV. 215 (1971); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pol-
lution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126; Melle, Private Legal
Action for Air Pollution, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 480 (1970); Miller & Borchers, Private
Lawsuits and Air Pollution Control, 56 A.B.A.J. 465 (1970); Rheingold, Civil Cause of
Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV.
17 (1966); Comment, Air Pollution, Nuisance Law, and Private Litigation, 1971 UTAH L.
REv. 142; Comment, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 24 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 314
(1967). Concerning water pollution, see Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation,
1971 Wis. L. REV. 738; Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
734 (1970); Note, Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions, 79 YALE L.J. 102
(1969). See generally J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT-A HANDBOOK FOR CrrIZEN
ACTION (1972); Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuTcERs L. REV. 230 (1970); Little,
New Attitudes About Legal Protection for Remains of Florida's Natural Environment, 23
U. FLA. L. REV. 459 (1971); Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New
Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REV. 145 (1972); Comment, Environmental
Law: New Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. REV. 78 (1971).
64. See materials cited in note 63 supra.
65. Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163. 168 (1847).
66. In Eaton v. Klimm, 18 P.2d 678 (Cal. 1933), the California Supreme Court held
that a zoning ordinance authorizing the continued operation of an asphalt mixing plant
did not preclude closing the plant as a public nuisance:
It is also to be noted that the fact that, by the zoning ordinance which zoned the
district as a light industrial district, the appellants were permitted to continue the
operation of their plant, is not an absolute defense to proceedings for the abatement
of such business on the ground that it constitutes a nuisance. "It has been held a
number of times in this court that a license, permit, or franchise does not authorize
the creation or maintenance of a nuisance." People v. City of Reedley, 66 Cal. App.
409, 413, 226 P. 408, 409. This rule is not only applicable to private nuisances
(Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259 P. 484; Fendley v. City
of Anaheim, 110 Cal. App. 731, 294 P. 769; Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons (Cal. Sup.]
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can enjoin as a nuisance construction of a funeral home6 7 or a gasoline
station8 in a residential neighborhood, although in each case the
neighborhood was zoned to permit such construction. Courts that have
found that zoning is a defense against actions to abate a public nui-
sance have held that the operation of a business in a suitably zoned
area cannot be a public nuisance per se. Such decisions do not eliminate
the possibility that any business can become either a public or a private
nuisance because of improper operation.6 9
Permits. A permit for a particular operation may be no defense to
a company in a suit to enjoin that operation as a nuisance. 70 This
same principle has been applied to enjoin a city from discharging im-
properly treated sewage constituting a public nuisance although the
state had approved emission of the pollutants.71 City, county or other
governmental bodies cannot transform a nuisance into a non-nuisance
merely by adopting zoning ordinances or issuing permits and licenses.
72
13 P. (2d) 733), but to public nuisances as well. (People v. City of Reedley, supra).
Id. at 681. When a business complying with local zoning ordinances is attacked as a
public nuisance, California now statutorily imposes upon the complainant the burden of
proving that the defendant employed "unnecessary and injurious" methods. CAL. Civ. PRo.
CODE § 731a (West Supp. 1974); Gelfand v. O'Haver, 200 P.2d 790, 791 (Cal. 1948) (in-
junction upheld); accord, Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350
(Ct. App. 1971).
Pennsylvania's supreme court adopted reasoning similar to that of the California court
when it ruled that a manufacturing firm in a district zoned for manufacturing must in-
stall its machinery in a way to avoid depriving surrounding residents of the degree of
quiet to which they were entitled as homeowners. See Quinn v. American Spiral Spring &
Mfg. Co., 141 A. 855, 857 (Pa. 1928). In 1972, Colorado's highest court upheld issuance of
an injunction against keeping horses on the defendant's property, although county zoning
ordinances permitted this, the defendant had exercised all reasonable skill and care in
maintaining the property, and the defendant had violated no health regulations. Hobbs v.
Smith, 493 P.2d 1352 (Colo. 1972). The court found that the noxious odors and flies at-
tracted to the horses made the horses a nuisance in fact. See also Ferreira v. D'Asaro, 152
So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 245 So. 2d 385
(La. 1971); Ellis v. Blanchard, 45 So. 2d 100 (La. Ct. App. 1950).
67. Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473 (Ark. 1958).
68. Appeal of Perrin, 156 A. 305 (Pa. 1931).
69. Courts finding compliance with zoning ordinances to be a defense against an
action for abatement of a public nuisance have generally argued that zoning regulations
preempt the law of public nuisance. See, e.g., Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 169 P.2d 171
(Colo. 1946); Bauman v. Piser Undertakers Co., 180 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. Ct. App. 1962); Fair-
fax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 97 P.2d 574 (Okla. 1939) (denying injunction but allowing claim
for monetary damages); Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 206 P. 976 (Wash. 1922). But
see Hobbs v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1352 (Colo. 1972) (severely restricting Luthi, supra); Shields
v. School Dist. No. 81, 196 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1948); Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 129
N.W.2d 217, 220 (Wis. 1964) (expressly rejecting rationale of Luthi, supra).
70. See Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473 (Ark. 1958); Jones v. Kelly Trust Co.,
18 S.W.2d 356 (Ark. 1929); State ex rel. Parker-Washington Co. v. City of St. Louis, 105
S.W. 748 (Mo. 1907).
71. People v. City of Los Angeles, 325 P.2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
72. First Natl Bank v. Tyson, 32 So. 144 (Ala. 1902); People v. City of Los Angeles,
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Use of "Due Care." Several court decisions hold that negligence is
not an element of an action for nuisance; the use of the most modern
methods of technology is no excuse for creating a nuisance.73 Always
the issue to be decided is whether the "business as conducted seriously
disturbs persons of normal and ordinary sensibilities in the comfort,
use and enjoyment of their homes and interferes with their property
rights."74 The right of habitation has been held superior to the rights
of trade. Thus the operation of a business conducted in a proper
manner and with the most modern equipment may still be enjoined
if it detrimentally affects citizens' right of habitation."
VI. THE Fox WON'T GUARD THE CHICKENS
The creation of pollution control agencies to regulate the polluters
does not necessarily result in less pollution. Continuing pollution is
almost assured if one bureaucracy (the pollution control agency) be-
comes established to control other bureaucracies (primarily large corpo-
rations and municipalities). Professor Levitt has observed:
Once their priorities are established, private and public bureaucracies
operate about the same .... [I]t is precisely because they are basically
so alike that one is an unreliable overseer of the other: bureaucratic
professionals will not generally question or attack each other's basic
security.76
Legal scholars share this opinion and recognize the need for legal
remedies which circumvent public bureaucracies." They fear the sym-
biotic relationship that usually develops between the regulator and the
325 P.2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817 (Ga. 1934);
Mercer County v. City of Harrodsburg, 66 S.W. 10 (Ky. 1902); cf. Commonwealth ex rel.
Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co.. 79 A.2d 459 (Pa. 1951).
73. Pearson v. Kansas City, 55 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1932); cases cited in note 75 infra.
74. Sarraillon v. Stevenson, 43 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Neb. 1950).
75. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nor. Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Godfrey, 207 U.S. 597 (1907); King v. Columbian Carbon
Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581
(Cal. 1910); Pitner v. Shugart Bros., 103 S.E. 791 (Ga. 1920); Robinson v. Westman, 29
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1947). Unfortunately, the willingness of some courts to protect the
rights of habitation extends only to awarding damages without injunctive relief. See
Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959); Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
76. T. LEvrrr, THE THIRD SEcrOR, NEW TACTICS FOR A RESPONSIVE SOCIErY 30-31 (1973).
77. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1048 (1964); Maloney, Judicial
Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REV.
145, 147 (1972). Maloney refers his readers to Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to
Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv. Crv. RiGHTS--Civ. LiB. L. Rv. 32 (1970).
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regulated.7 8 The sheer number of public bureaucracies, usually operat-
ing at cross purposes,79 is another serious problem. The author, in his
experience with both federal and state litigation and administrative
procedures, has continually found control of the most dangerous pol-
lutants to be within the jurisdiction of the same agencies which support
the use of that pollutant. The Atomic Energy Commission, for ex-
ample, controls radiation but encourages the use of nuclear energy.
8 0
The Army Corps of Engineers dredges, fills and pollutes while the En-
vironmental Protection Agency tries to stop pollution.s ' State and
federal agriculture departments encourage the use of chlorinate hydro-
carbons (for example, DDT or Mirex) while state and federal pollu-
tion-control agencies seek to prevent the spread of toxic substances, in-
cluding pesticides.
Chief Justice Warren Burger, when he was circuit judge on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, expressed doubt
that the Federal Trade Commission could be relied upon to act in the
public interest without the prodding of "private attorneys general."
82
His mistrust of federal agencies was echoed by federal Circuit Judge
Tamm, who believed that the courts must continue to review the de-
cisions of federal agencies in suits brought by aggrieved parties until
this country adopts an ombudsman system that will act as a watchdog
of such agency activity.8 3
The unresponsive nature of government enforcement agencies re-
quires that immediate access to the courts be available to provide relief
from the irreparable injury caused by pollution. It is not enough to
rely solely upon agencies that are sympathetic to the polluters they
have the duty to control and are so crippled by internecine warfare
that they are impotent. Legal scholars, judges and social commentators
78. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. Rgv.
577, 596 (1954); Stigler, Process of Economic Regulation, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 207 (1972).
79. For a brief discussion of the problems of pollution control and a description of
federal agencies operating at cross purposes, see Reitze, Pollution Control: Why Has It
Failed?, 55 A.B.A.J. 923, 926 (1969).
80. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has sole control over radioactive dis-
charges. States cannot enforce controls more strict than those of the Commission. Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afl'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
The AEC has been somewhat restrained by the National Environmental Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-47 (1970). See, e.g., Brooks v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 476 F.2d 924 (D.D.C. 1973);
Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.D.C. 1971); 10
C.F.R. pt. 50, App. D (1974).
81. For a discussion of the pollution caused by federal agencies, see 1 A. RUrZE, EN-
VMONMENTAL LAw 4-104 to -107 (1972).
82. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
83. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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have seen the danger of leaving war to the generals. Hopefully others
will follow their signal.
VII. CASE LAw ON THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC NuIsANCE AUTHOITY vs.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF POLLUTION
A Survey of Cases in Which the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Has Been Rejected. Most courts have refused to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or similar doctrines in actions to abate pollution as
a public nuisance. The United States Supreme Court has implicitly re-
fused to apply the doctrine to cases involving the federal water pollu-
tion control laws,84 and a federal district court ruled that Oregon's air
pollution law does not preempt the field and prohibit suits to abate
private or public nuisances.85 Several state courts also have refused to
deprive their courts of equity of their traditional jurisdiction over nui-
sance actions.86
84. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
85. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
86. In Delaware, it has been held that the courts can not be deprived of their con-
stitutional jurisdiction unless an equivalent remedy is provided by the legislature and
unless that remedy is expressly or by necessary implication made exclusive. The courts
refused to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, although the state air pollution
law created an equivalent remedy, because the legislature had not given exclusive authority
to the air pollution authority. See, e.g., Webb v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 237 A.2d 143
(Del. Ch. 1967); Pottock v. Continental Can Co., 210 A.2d 295 (Del. Ch. 1965). In a
breach of contract action, the Delaware Supreme Court held that at best the primary
jurisdiction doctrine contemplated a "temporary abstention" in deference to the ex-
pertise of the administrative agency, but this abstention was to be only a noncommittal
referral to seek the benefit of the agency's views while "at the same time avoiding any
suggestion of abdication of the jurisdiction of that court." Eastern Shore Natural Gas Co.
v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 298 A.2d 322, 325 (Del. 1972).
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that Georgia's air quality control act does not
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Board of Health in matters concerning air pollution, and
does not prevent a district attorney from instituting an action to enjoin a public nuisance.
J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 175 S.E.2d 847 (Ga. 1970). In the court's opinion, establish-
ment of a legislative program for air quality control did not repeal or preempt the state
prosecutor's authority to seek such relief. That the law had not explicitly indicated legisla-
tive intent to preserve other remedies for suppressing air pollution-caused nuisances
seems to have had no effect on the court's decision.
Kentucky's highest court also has ruled that a state pollution control law that is to be
construed as ancillary and supplementary to existing pollution control and conservation
laws has not abrogated the common law actions against public nuisance. See City of
Lexington v. Cox, 481 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1972); Ohio River Sand Co. v. Commonwealth,
467 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1971). New York courts too have upheld the attorney general's right
to seek abatement of a public nuisance. Finding state pollution control programs not the
exclusive remedy for ending air pollution, the courts have ruled that it is proper for the
attorney general to seek injunctive relief on behalf of the people of New York. See State
v. Town of Huntington, 325 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), af'd, 326 N.Y.S.2d 981
(App. Div. 1971).
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A recent opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court perhaps offers
the best analysis of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and reasons for
rejecting it.87 That state's attorney general had commenced a suit in
equity on behalf of the state to abate a public nuisance. The defendants
raised three major defenses: (1) that a law granting the state's Depart-
ment of Natural Resources broad authority to control air and water
pollution had repealed by implication the attorney general's authority
to bring such a suit; (2) that the attorney general had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies; and (3) that the doctrine of primary juris-
diction barred the state from seeking relief in court.
After thoroughly dissecting and rejecting these arguments, the
court, perhaps taking its cue from the opinion of Great Northern Rail-
way Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,"" ruled that the doctrine was inap-
plicable because issues of law rather than of fact were paramount in
the case. The relief to be granted the plaintiff was to be treated as a
question of policy and law, thus lying within the special expertise of
the circuit court, not of the administrative agency.8 9
In Florida, at least one district court of appeal has ruled that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not prevent Florida's attorney
general from seeking an injunction to abate a public nuisance created
by air pollution, although the state has a law vesting authority for pol-
lution control in the Department of Pollution Control.90 The court
found that determination of whether a public nuisance exists his-
torically has been a judicial function, which did not necessarily require
reliance upon technical criteria for its resolution.9 1 The court found
that, when factual conditions can be easily established, the decision that
these conditions constitute an abatable nuisance, together with the
selection of the most appropriate remedy, is a matter of law, within the
"special competence of judicial expertise. " 92
These cases indicate that the satisfaction of pollution control stan-
dards established by a legislature does not create a defense to an action
for abatement of a nuisance. In support of this interpretation, one com-
87. State v. Dairyland Power Coop., 187 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1971).
88. 259 U.S. 285 (1922); see notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
89. 187 N.W.2d at 884. Other state courts in non-pollution cases have refused to ap.
ply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction if points of law, and not factual problems within
the special expertise of an agency, were involved. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 44 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1950); Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc. v. J. & G. Ex-
press, Inc., 141 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 1962); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. M.T. Reed Const. Co., 51
So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1951); cases cited in note 29 supra.
90. State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa Electric Co., 291 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, No. 45,355 (Fla. July 5, 1974). The statute is F.. STAT. ch. 403 (1973).
91. 291 So. 2d at 47.
92. Id.
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mentator has compared the effect of these standards to that of statutory
standards in negligence actions.93 Without realizing it, these courts have
accepted Justice Holmes' admonition in the famous air pollution case,
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.: 94 "Some peculiarities necessarily
mark a suit of this kind. If the State has a case at all, it is somewhat
more certainly entitled to specific relief than a private party might be."
A Survey of Cases Invoking the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine.
With rare exception, the cases in which the doctrine has been applied
have been private nuisance actions in which the plaintiff sought dam-
ages. One federal district court invoked the doctrine to dismiss an ac-
tion at law brought to recover damages to oyster beds caused by the
alleged polluter.9 5 In a subsequent case involving the same polluter, the
same judge, indicating that the former plaintiff had chosen to ignore
the judge's strong suggestion to appeal the decision, again applied the
doctrine to bar the action.9 6
Another federal district court applied the doctrine to what was
ostensibly an air pollution case.97 The appellate court affirmed this
decision; it did not, however, agree that the case was barred by a theory
of abstention or by administrative jurisdiction, but rather held that the
complaint failed to state a claim under Illinois products liability law.98
Plaintiffs had claimed that the defendants' motor vehicles were defec-
tive because they emitted dangerous air pollutants. The relief sought
was: (1) that defendants be ordered to cease the sale of motor vehicles
within Chicago unless equipped with tamper-proof emission control
93. Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law
Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REv. 145, 156-57 (1972). The professor cites two cases to support
his position. In Mitchell v. Hotel Berry Co., 171 N.E. 39, 41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929), the
court found that the defendant was "not acquitted of a charge of common-law negligence
by proof of its compliance with the statutes." In Curtis v. Perry, 18 P.2d 840, 843 (Wash.
1933), the court found:
It must be borne in mind that statutory regulations relative to the conduct of
drivers of motor vehicles do not attempt to define what reasonable care is. They
set Up certain rules of conduct, violation of which carries a presumption of
negligence, but a compliance with which does not necessarily fulfill the obligation
to exercise reasonable care under given circumstances.
94. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
95. Ellison v. Rayonier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1957).
96. Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 855, 856 (W.D. Wash. 1964).
But see Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 218 A2d 360, 362 (N.H. 1966). In Uric landowners
sought injunctive relief to end water pollution that the state pollution control agency had
authorized to continue for another three years. The court granted the relief sought,
stating: "It seems doubtful if the Legislature has constitutional power to permit the de-
fendant to continue to commit private nuisances until September 1, 1969, since such
legislation would constitute taking private property for a non-public purpose." Id. at 362.
97. City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd,
467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972).
98. City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir. 1972).
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devices; and (2) that defendants give emission control devices to all
Chicago motor vehicle owners with autos manufactured between 1960
and 1967. The trial and appellate courts noted that the plaintiffs had
not attempted to enforce the federal law, but rather had tried to estab-
list standards under Illinois common law for products liability. Both
courts agreed that the Federal Air Quality Act9' specifically preempted
control of pollutants emitted from automobiles beginning with the
1968 models.100 Both decisions reveal the courts' preoccupation with the
problems of federal preemption and of the unique status of the auto-
mobile industry.
In the most recent federal court decision in which the doctrine has
been applied,101 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, reversing
the district court's decision, ordered that the case be referred to the
United States Forest Service for a determination of whether certain pro-
posed mining activities were compatible with the wilderness character
of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota. While not question-
ing that the construction of the Wilderness Act 10° is a legal issue, the
court found that factual issues remained, such as the effect of mining
upon the wilderness, and whether mining permits could be issued with
restrictions protecting the wilderness character of the area.10 8 The
Forest Service should determine factual issues, the court reasoned, and
a record should be built at that agency's hearing. Pending the agency's
hearing, the district court should stay its proceedings.
State courts also have invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine in
private nuisance actions.10 4 One Florida appellate court, although not
specifically naming the doctrine, has even applied it to justify dismissing
without prejudice a public nuisance action. 05 The plaintiffs had al-
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970) (originally enacted as Pub L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat.
485 (1967)). When federal legislation specifically preempts state and local control of an
activity, courts recognize such preemption. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afl'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Otherwise, the preemption
doctrine is not applied. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
100. See 332 F. Supp. at 290-91; 467 F.2d at 1264.
101. Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974).
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970).
103. 497 F.2d at 852-53.
104. A Michigan court has applied the doctrine to a private nuisance action brought
by a nonprofit conservation assocation. See White Lake Impr. Ass'n v. City of Whitehall,
177 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970). The plaintiffs, hoping to protect their riparian
interests, sought an injunction to prevent the discharge of inadequately treated waste into
lake waters. Because the pollution was not new and because the plaintiffs had failed to
show that a proceeding before the water resources commission could not result in ef-
fective relief, the court thought its reliance upon the doctrine justified. Id. at 484.
105. State ex rel. Jackson v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 257 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
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leged that a public nuisance was created by the defendant's trains op-
erating between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. The court held
that, if the plaintiff had a remedy, it lay with the Public Service Com-
mission, charged by statute'06 with control of railroad operations.'07
The courts applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine to common
law actions seeking pollution abatement or damages have emphasized
the problems of the polluter and the pollution control agencies, ignor-
ing or minimizing the problems of the persons suffering the effects of
pollution. The judges involved apparently have not yet attained the
level of enlightenment (or disillusionment) reached by Chief Justice
Burger, 08 and still believe that governmental enforcement agencies
will fulfill their role as protectors of the public interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The historic right and duty of the chief legal officers of state govern-
ment to protect the public welfare, and the traditional jurisdiction of
the equity courts, are directly challenged whenever the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is applied to actions for abatement of pollution-
caused nuisances. The doctrine was created because the Supreme Court
substituted its wisdom for that of Congress in 1907. This judicial at-
tempt to legislate was improper then; its subsequent application, par-
ticularly to actions arising because irreparable injury to public health
and welfare is threatened, has compounded the initial abuse of judicial
power. The result is a nightmarish situation in which access to the
courts may be delayed until it is too late to help the citizens suffering
from the effects of uncontrolled pollution.
It is doubtful that Kafka, a Czechoslovak, was aware of the Supreme
Court's decision in Texas & Pacific Railway'09 when he wrote The
Trial. It is also unlikely that he could have predicted that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction would be applied to an action for abatement
of a pollution-caused nuisance. But, if Kafka had foreseen and under-
stood these occurrences, perhaps the parable of the man from the
country would end as the man lay before the closed doors of the court
of equity, while the lights of the Law burned brightly within. Dying
106. FLA. STAT. § 350.12 (1973).
107. 257 So. 2d at 89. Noise, however, may now be considered a pollutant, and thus
its control is within the jurisdiction of the Florida Department of Pollution Control. FLA.
STAT. § 403.031(2) (1973). Because FLA. STAT. § 403.191 (1973) explicitly permits a public
nuisance action to abate pollution, it would appear that this case would be decided dif-
ferently today. See note 90 and accompanying text supra,
108. See note 82 and accompanying text supra,
109. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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from emphysema induced by polluted air,110 the man would find the
entrance barred by a great steel door, upon which is inscribed "Primary
Jurisdiction Doctrine."
110. People do die from air pollution. See generally P. EHRUcH & A. EmuLcH, POPU-
LATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT-ISSUES IN HUMAN ECOLOGY 147-52 (2d ed. 1972).
